When a court is considering whether to grant an injunction to stop an innocent (the trespasser does not know they are trespassing) trespass to real estate, the judge applies the balancing the hardships test – how is the owner whose property is being encroached upon, versus the hardship to the trespasser to remove the encroachment. This is an equitable decision, as opposed to the case of prescriptive easement, in which the judge applies a strict set of statutory rules. Cases have established that there should not be an “exclusive” prescriptive easement. However, in a relative hardship analysis, the court may establish what is actually an exclusive use easement.. Sacramento and El Dorado real estate attorneys may consider the difference in the two remedies in fashioning their claims for relief.
In Hirshfield v. Schwartz, the Hirshfields were elderly sisters who lived in their Bel-Air house since 1940. The Schwartzes moved in 1979. Both assumed that the chain link fence between their properties marked their property line. The defendants made several improvements: they extended the fence, built waterfalls a koi pond and stone deck, added a putting green and sand trap. After a car entered their front yard, to keep the kids safe they built an exceptionally strong block wall with the largest rebar available. Meanwhile the plaintiff sisters maintained a variety of exotic plants and trees, making it a botanical showplace..
It always starts with a survey, which the plaintiffs did. The survey disclosed that the defendants trespassed on their property in two locations. In the front, the block wall encroached. In the rear, part of the sand trap, extensive underground water and electrical lines, and several motors underground in a concrete and iron enclosure were encroaching. The plaintiffs, claiming that they needed the front portion to build a circular driveway, and the rear portion to install a greenhouse, filed suit to quiet title and trespass.
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The judge was not impressed by Gavina’s conduct. Because of the nature of the suit (quiet title), it first addressed the question of whether the option itself created a contract, or was merely an executable contract to make a lease. It found the intent of the parties, as expressed in the option agreement, to set forth in both the option and the attached form of lease all the terms and conditions on which Gavina’s offer to lease was made. By exercising the option, Smith accepted the offer and agreed to the lease on the those terms. The requirement of a written lease was satisfied. (
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